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It has become a cliche´ to observe that the global anti-apartheid movement was one of
the largest, most widely supported, longest sustained, most significant, and most
successful transnational movements of the twentieth century. The movement was
surprisingly little researched while apartheid in South Africa continued, but since
South Africa’s first nonracial democratic elections in , there has been a steady
trickle of studies on the struggle against apartheid outside South Africa itself. That
trickle is rapidly becoming a flood: in particular, doctoral dissertations on the subject
are proliferating, though many of those already completed have not—or not
yet—been published.1 The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid by Rob Skinner and Gordian
Knot by Ryan Irwin are two of the first of these recent dissertations to have been
published as monographs.
Whereas a high proportion of earlier studies of external anti-apartheid activism
were written by former participants, Irwin and Skinner are from a generation of
scholars who did not themselves participate in the events and movements they analyze.
Both books are representative of an emerging stream of more detached and more
critical scholarship on the global anti-apartheid movement. Moreover, whereas earlier
studies of the external anti-apartheid movement usually adopted a national frame of
analysis, studying action against apartheid by or within a single state, Irwin’s and
Skinner’s studies reflect the recent “international turn”: both are based on multi-
archival research on three continents—Africa, Europe, and North America—and are
focused on the international and/or transnational connections and activities of those
who sought to contribute to ending apartheid from outside South Africa.
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Beyond these similarities The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid and Gordian Knot
differ in their chronological focus, their analyses of the strategy and ideology of the
external anti-apartheid movement, and the actors they choose to study. Each of these
issues is ripe for reexamination: this essay addresses each in turn, highlighting the ways
in which Irwin’s and Skinner’s groundbreaking studies advance the study of the
external anti-apartheid movement and the avenues for future research that they
suggest.
Strikingly, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid and Gordian Knot are both centrally
concerned with periodization. Indeed, Irwin has represented his project as “a plea for
historical specificity—an attempt to read the past forwards rather than backwards and
return attention to how political pathways opened and closed in real-time for historical
actors.”2 In their concern for historical specificity, both analyses contrast with much
of the existing literature on the external anti-apartheid movement, which has generally
been characterized either by narrative descriptions or by thematic or topical
approaches that tend to obscure the significance of change over time.
Skinner’s primary thesis is that the “foundations of anti-apartheid” of his title were
laid in the s, the period that was the focus of his doctoral dissertation and that
remains at the heart of the published monograph, even as the chronological frame has
been extended back to the early twentieth century. “The ideological and tactical
framework of anti-apartheid,” Skinner argues, “was established in the late s and
early s” (, see also , ).
In contrast, Irwin’s work, tightly focused on “the postcolonial decade” after ,
represents a direct riposte to Skinner’s thesis of ideological, organizational, tactical,
and strategic continuity from the early years of the decade onward. Gordian Knot
pivots on the “watershed” of –, the moment when it became clear that the
United Nations General Assembly would be unable to pressure the Western
permanent members of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions, and when the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its ruling that Ethiopia and Liberia had
insufficient “legal right or interest” to challenge South Africa’s administration of South
West Africa under a League of Nations Mandate. The UN and the ICJ were, Irwin
suggests, core elements of the “international system based . . . on legal structure and
multilateralism” that the United States had constructed after the Second World War
to underpin its global hegemony. This system “opened a range of pathways for Third
World activists in the years surrounding decolonization,” as the entry of newly inde-
pendent African states transformed the membership of the United Nations ().
The failure to achieve mandatory sanctions through action either at the UN or at
the ICJ, however, represented the effective closure of two of the primary political
pathways through which opponents of apartheid outside South Africa had sought to
pursue their struggle in the first half of the s. Out of that watershed moment,
Irwin has suggested, “emerged a much different sort of [anti-]apartheid
movement—the one we associate with the s.”3 For Irwin, that difference mani-
fested itself in shifts in the strategy, ideology, and composition of the movement—all
elements that Skinner implies remained largely constant from the early s. Like
Skinner, Irwin thus tends to flatten the period following that on which he focuses his
own research. Political pathways, however, continued to open and close over the next
two decades: the external struggle against apartheid in the s and the s—the
latter the decade in which the scope, diversity, and complexity of anti-apartheid
activity reached its zenith—represents fertile ground for future research animated by
the same concern for historical specificity that motivates Irwin and Skinner.
These complexities are evident in the two authors’ respective analyses of anti-apartheid
strategy. One of the core “foundations of anti-apartheid” that emerges from Skinner’s
study is the advocacy of the isolation of South Africa from international contact of
various kinds. From the early s, support for such isolation became one of the
primary means by which the self-defined “anti-apartheid movement” defined and
demarcated itself. Indeed, advocacy of isolation became such a defining feature of the
anti-apartheid movement that it has largely become naturalized in existing under-
standings of the international struggle against apartheid. In both the popular and the
scholarly imagination, the specific forms in which external opposition to apartheid
were manifested (and which subsequently other international campaigns have often
sought to reproduce) are frequently treated as if they were self-evident, natural, and
obvious reactions to apartheid—and therefore not requiring explanation. Thus, for
example, although Gordian Knot is focused on the implementation—and eventual
defeat—of the “distinct strategy” of attempting to use the General Assembly and the
ICJ to push the Security Council to impose economic sanctions against South Africa,
Irwin never explains precisely why the newly independent African states adopted this
strategy, nor why they believed it represented the best way of confronting apartheid.
One of Skinner’s most significant contributions is to initiate the process of denatural-
izing the forms that external opposition to apartheid came to take and to show instead
the contingent and contested way they emerged.
Skinner shows, for instance, that one of the earliest proposals calling for the
United Nations to coordinate the imposition of economic sanctions against South
Africa was made in  by Trevor Huddleston, a British priest then serving in Johan-
nesburg. Although India had broken off trade relations with South Africa in
—the same year the Indian government had formally complained to the UN
about South Africa’s treatment of its Indian minority—India does not appear to have
attempted to persuade other states to follow suit and did not call for the UN to
recommend or impose economic sanctions.4 Huddleston’s private proposal for UN-
coordinated multilateral sanctions thus broke new ground. But as Skinner shows, “a
coherent and unified call for sanctions” emerged only gradually. Huddleston’s
suggestion was rejected by its recipients, the executive of the Africa Bureau, the
London-based body founded in  and directed by Michael Scott, another British
Anglican priest who had served in South Africa in the s. Many of the Bureau’s
executive members were “taken aback” by Huddleston’s proposal and were strongly
critical of it (–).
However, Scott himself—as well as Canon John Collins of St Paul’s Cathedral in
London, the founder of what would become the Defence and Aid Fund for South
Africa—were more sympathetic to Huddleston’s ideas for isolating South Africa
through UN sanctions and/or nongovernmental consumer and cultural boycotts.
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Initially, their sporadic advocacy of economic isolation had little impact. Only in
– did discussion of and advocacy for an international economic boycott of
South Africa begin to become a significant feature of the international apartheid
debate. The analysis of how and why this occurred in The Foundations of Anti-
Apartheid is groundbreaking but narrow in focus. Skinner’s doctoral dissertation was
an analysis of “the emergence in Britain during the s of Christian opposition to
apartheid” and though in the published monograph the scope of his analysis has been
significantly widened, Skinner’s focus remains above all on the “small group of
[British] Anglican priests” who were his original objects of study.5 How did the early
advocacy for boycotts and/or sanctions by Huddleston, Scott, and Collins that
Skinner’s research has revealed relate to the simultaneous discussions of using
economic pressure such as trade sanctions or denying loan credit to South Africa that
were taking place in the s in the Caribbean6 and in the United States?7 Or to the
various boycott initiatives taken by others around the world between  and :
the  All-African People’s Conference in Ghana; the Committee of African Organ-
isations, an umbrella group of Africans in Britain; the prominent Kenyan labor leader
Tom Mboya; the Jamaican government; and—perhaps most important of all for the
internationalization of the boycott—the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions, the noncommunist labor international? Skinner mentions these various initia-
tives in passing, but their relationship to the earlier advocacy by his British “liberal
humanitarians” remains unclear.
Most strikingly, the call for an external boycott campaign by the African National
Congress (ANC) itself in  seems almost to come out of nowhere in Skinner’s final
chapter (–). This was a crucial moment, for it encouraged and gave legitimacy
to the various boycott initiatives already being taken outside South Africa and ensured
that isolation would become established as one of the “foundations” of anti-apartheid
activism for the subsequent three decades. But how did such action fit into the ANC
leaders’ strategies for ending apartheid at the end of the s, and what role and
degree of significance did they assign to it? Skinner’s account suggests that the answers
to such questions are likely to be considerably more complex than has often been
assumed. The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid hints at a process of dynamic interaction
between the ideas and strategies of Skinner’s foreign liberal humanitarians and those
of the ANC leadership. Although, as Skinner shows, those liberal humanitarians
increasingly came to understand opposition to apartheid in terms of support the ANC
in the s, it is also evident from his account that they were at the same time
engaged in a process of experimentation and innovation with regard to how that
support could best be expressed abroad. Contrary to most popular and academic
assumptions about the nature of anti-apartheid solidarity, Skinner’s anti-apartheid
pioneers were not simply responding to requests made by the ANC; the flow of stra-
tegic influence was not unidirectional. Indeed, Skinner’s account suggests that it was
precisely Huddleston’s pessimism about the likelihood of success of the ANC’s
strategy in South Africa that caused him to place increasing emphasis on the need for
international action: he concluded in the wake of the government’s legislative
clampdown on civil disobedience in  that South Africa was becoming a totalitarian
state where internal criticism would become increasingly difficult and that, conse-
quently, “the only thing which might shake our Government is determined hostility
from the rest of the world” (–, –). This was not a perception shared at the
time by the ANC leadership, which continued for the rest of the decade to focus on
internal campaigns.
Undoubtedly, however, members of the ANC leadership became much more
interested in the potentialities of forms of external pressure from , especially after
the Sharpeville Massacre and the subsequent banning of both the ANC and the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC), which had broken away from the ANC the previous year.
Indeed, Skinner and Irwin both imply that from  onward both South African
liberation movements came to believe that change in South Africa could only be
achieved through international action (Skinner, , ; Irwin, , , , ). Like
most scholars of external anti-apartheid activism, both authors thus overemphasize the
significance of international action in the strategies of leading South African oppo-
nents of apartheid, and both underplay the centrality of violence to those strategies
after . In terms of anti-apartheid strategy, the most important development in the
period after Sharpeville was the “turn to violence” by the PAC, the ANC, the ANC’s
increasingly close ally the South African Communist Party (SACP), and other smaller
groups. In his early and influential study of ANC strategy, Howard Barrell argued
that it was in this period that within the ANC “armed activity came to be viewed not
only as the primary means by which eventually to overthrow the South African state
but also as the major means by which to advance in each phase of escalation towards
that goal.”8 A vibrant and rapidly expanding literature now exists in South African
historiography on the subject of the ANC’s “armed struggle.”9 In declining to engage
with this literature, Skinner and Irwin not only give an incomplete impression of the
nature of strategy of the liberation movements in the s but also miss an oppor-
tunity to bring international history and South African history into productive
dialogue. International historians have much to contribute. Historians of South Africa
have generally followed Barrell in exhibiting “limited interest in the ANC’s broad
range of strategies” after , and in focusing on their violent dimension.10 To a
significant extent, therefore, the question of the precise role and significance attributed
to various forms of international action by ANC and PAC leaders—themselves by no
means united on strategic questions—remains largely unanswered.
The significance of the turn to violence after  qualifies Skinner’s thesis of
strategic continuity from the late s (). While some elements of the tactical
repertoire of the external anti-apartheid movement were developed then, the strategies
into which those tactics were fitted shifted dramatically and repeatedly over time.
Ideas about the relative significance of, on the one hand, various modes of external
anti-apartheid activity, and, on the other, various forms of action inside South Africa
did not remain static. Within leading component bodies of the global anti-apartheid
movement—such as the exiled ANC, the American Committee on Africa, the Anti-
Apartheid Movement (AAM) in Britain, or the governments of leading African
states—there were significant shifts over time in ideas about precisely how apartheid
might ultimately end, and about the relationship of various modes of external anti-
apartheid activity to various forms of nonviolent internal resistance (such as strikes,
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civil disobedience, or domestic boycotts) and various strategies of sabotage or guerrilla
warfare in bringing about that end.
One of Skinner’s most striking insights is that for two of the earliest advocates of
the economic and cultural isolation of South Africa, the British priests Huddleston
and Collins, that advocacy was based on the long-standing belief of white liberal
Christians in South Africa that social change would come about through a “change of
heart” on the part of white South Africans. Even as Huddleston and Collins broke
decisively with white liberals and the Anglican Church establishment over the means
by which such a change of heart could be brought about, Huddleston’s  call for
“the Christian conscience” abroad to be “so aroused as to find expression in the
isolation of South Africa—until she repents” was thus still ultimately, Skinner argues,
“an intensified version of the liberal Christian faith in the transformative potential of
Christianity.” This important insight begs the question of the extent to which this
“narrative of white redemption as the pathway to social justice”—based on a psycho-
logical or spiritual understanding of racism as a problem of individual conscience
rather than, say, as a systemic problem of political economy—continued to underpin
subsequent efforts by anti-apartheid activists to isolate South Africa.11
Skinner and Irwin both suggest that by the early s those who advocated
economic sanctions did so because they believed that sanctions were “a means to exert
pressure on the South African government” or to “modulate Pretoria’s approach and
eventually bring black Africans to power” (Skinner, ; Irwin, , emphasis added).
The idea that the global struggle against apartheid was always driven by this model of
change has gained considerable traction in recent years from the fact that it roughly
approximates to the process that did occur in South Africa between  and ,
when the National Party government did indeed open negotiations with the oppo-
nents of apartheid, abolished apartheid laws, and ultimately agreed to a transition to
nonracial democracy.12 To assume that such a model of change had always been
pursued by the global anti-apartheid movement, however, is to lose sight of the
contested and shifting strategies of an amorphous and multipolar movement, pres-
enting instead a retrospective picture of imagined coherence and homogeneity across
time. Boycotts and sanctions were conceived by different advocates at different times
as operating in a multiplicity of ways, from, for instance, causing economic hardship
that would lead white voters to elect a more liberal alternative to the National Party,
to weakening the state’s capability to resist a guerrilla onslaught.13 One of the most
striking things about the emergence of economic isolation as a foundational character-
istic of anti-apartheid activism was that it subsequently proved attractive to such an
extraordinary range of opponents of apartheid with diverse ideas on how apartheid
might be ended and on the role that isolation might play.
Just as ideas about the relationship of external anti-apartheid activity to internal
action changed over time, ideas about the significance of various modes of external
anti-apartheid activity relative to each other likewise did not remain static. Skinner
suggests, for example, that “the anti-apartheid movement was perpetually pulled in
two directions simultaneously: towards interaction with political institutions [such as
lobbying for governmental economic sanctions] and popular mobilisation [such as
consumer boycotts]” (). But rather than the two being in “perpetual” tension,
Irwin demonstrates convincingly that the balance in the significance attached by
leading actors to external anti-apartheid activity at state and nonstate levels shifted
crucially over time. The failure to achieve mandatory sanctions through action either
in the General Assembly or at the ICJ by the mid-s brought about a “strategic
change,” Irwin shows, premised on a widely held “more restrictive vision” of the UN,
as “efforts at the United Nations began to shift from the sanctions fight to propaganda
activities” and to encouraging and legitimizing anti-apartheid action by nongovern-
mental actors. In contrast to the optimism of the early sixties—when policymakers in
the newly independent African states had placed much faith in the UN and other
international institutions as means of achieving their goals—African diplomats by the
end of the decade “were publicly renouncing the [UN’s] capacity to deliver post-
colonial justice” (, , ). As Irwin has noted, his account thus complicates
Matthew Connelly’s influential argument that the – Algerian war of indepen-
dence was a harbinger of “the post-Cold War era.” Algeria’s independence may, as
Connelly argues, have been “a diplomatic revolution” because “its most decisive
struggles occurred in the international arena.”14 But only a handful of years later
revolutionaries at the other end of the African continent had recognized that the
potential of the UN was much more limited than they had initially believed or than
the Algerian precedent might have suggested.
The effective defeat in – of the African states’ campaign for UN sanctions,
Irwin argues, led the ANC to adopt an approach “based on fighting South Africa not
at the United Nations but through the pathways that existed around, between, and
within the nation-state system.” In Irwin’s account, the ANC believed that it would
overcome apartheid, “not because [it] possessed conventional military and economic
strength, but because it possessed people power, or the ability to shape how individuals
outside the corridors of government discussed and debated the apartheid issue. If the
organization embraced these information tactics and took the long view in its fight
against Pretoria, victory would emerge organically from the imperatives of global-
ization” (–) That this was their strategy would have come as surprising news to
the ANC’s leading strategists in the late s, a period when their attention was
focused—in the words of the strategy document the ANC formally adopted in
—on guerrilla warfare as “the special, and in our case the only form in which the
armed liberation struggle can be launched,” and on “the future all-out war which
would eventually lead to the conquest of power.”15 But Irwin is nevertheless surely
correct that as state-based political pathways at the UN and ICJ were closing, “post-
colonial globalization” meant that “pathways beyond the purview of national power
were proliferating rapidly, providing new outlets for non-state organizations” (). It
was in precisely this period, the late s and early s, that there was a prolifer-
ation of anti-apartheid campaigns focused on the role of nongovernmental
bodies—especially multinational corporations and sports organizations. The addition
or new emphasis on these modes of anti-apartheid activity within the repertoire of
action of the global anti-apartheid movement offers much scope for further research.16
Alongside their analyses of strategy, a second major issue that emerges from a
comparison of Skinner’s and Irwin’s work is that of the identity and ideology of the
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global anti-apartheid movement. Together with advocacy of isolation, a second core
“foundation of anti-apartheid” that emerges from Skinner’s study is “solidarity” with
African nationalist resistance to apartheid, as embodied by the ANC and later also the
PAC. It was in the s, Skinner argues, that such solidarity was established as “the
key component of the movement’s identity” (, ).17 The early chapters of The
Foundations of Anti-Apartheid show how earlier in the twentieth century metropolitan
white humanitarians’ paternalistic concern with the protection of “native welfare” in
South Africa manifested itself in support for the system of territorial segregation
through the creation of “native reserves.” And throughout the first half of the century,
these British “friends of Africa” continued to follow the lead of white South African
liberals and missionaries, with their emphases on promoting the social welfare (rather
than the political power) of Africans, on gradual reform, and on improving race rela-
tions through white-led interracial “cooperation” with moderate African leaders.
Some external groups and individuals did, of course, align themselves more
explicitly with black South African opponents of apartheid in the period before the
s. Indeed, Skinner devotes significant attention in his earlier chapters to the radi-
calization of the African American activist Max Yergan and to the anticolonial and
anti-apartheid activism of the New York–based Council on African Affairs (CAA) that
Yergan founded with Paul Robeson in . But, in line with a long-established trend
in the historiography of this topic, Skinner emphasizes the suppression and marginali-
zation in the red scares of the s of such earlier manifestations of radical
anticolonialism among African Americans. It was in this context, he argues, that “a
new generation of liberal activists . . . came to the forefront of anti-apartheid activity”
().18
Skinner emphasizes how in the s liberal white Christians such as Scott,
Huddleston, Collins, and the American Methodist minister George Houser—the
founder and executive director of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA)—came
gradually (and at different speeds) to challenge the previous alignment with white
South African liberals that had initially shaped their own approaches and those of
many other external critics of apartheid. Instead they aligned themselves in support of
the ANC. In so doing, they helped lay the groundwork for the subsequent alignment
of many other white liberals in Britain and the United States with African nationalism
in South Africa, despite the prevailing Cold War atmosphere of anticommunism and
the widespread suspicion in the West of the liberation movements.
Skinner’s account of this development is one piece of a much larger puzzle—in
this case the story of the radicalization of African nationalism throughout Africa in
the s and s and how various groups throughout the world responded to that
development. The response of influential individual white Christian liberals in
aligning themselves with African nationalism undoubtedly played an important role
in establishing “the foundations of anti-apartheid,” as Skinner shows. But so did the
response of several other constituencies. The s were also the period when, in
Britain at least, radical anticolonialism, explicitly aligned with the demands of anti-
colonial nationalists in the British Empire, grew rapidly in strength, influence, and
organization. This development had its clearest manifestation in the formation of the
Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) in  by the left-wing Labour Party MP
Fenner Brockway, and in the MCF’s rapid eclipse of the more gradualist Fabian
Colonial Bureau.19 In the United States, although the radical anticolonialism asso-
ciated with the CAA may have been suppressed, recent research by Carol Anderson
and others has emphasized the vitality of liberal anticolonialism among African
Americans in this period, showing that the liberal leadership of the National Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was more supportive of
foreign anticolonial nationalists and less exclusively focused on domestic discrimi-
nation than many scholars had earlier assumed.20
Finally, it was also in the course of the s that the Soviet Union and the
international communist movement decisively threw their support behind bourgeois-
dominated nationalist movements in the colonial world—including the ANC in
South Africa—on the basis of the theory that a “national democratic revolution” could
establish the basis for a subsequent transition to socialism. This development made
possible the increasingly close alliance in the s of the ANC and the underground
SACP and established the basis for the subsequent support the ANC in exile received
both from Western communist parties and from the governments of the Eastern
Bloc.21
This widespread shift to solidarity with African nationalism in the s had
crucial consequences. For three decades after , even as the two South African
liberation movements’ fortunes waxed and waned, and as their ideologies and strat-
egies shifted, the idea that opposition to apartheid was synonymous with support for
the ANC and/or the PAC exerted a powerful hold over external opponents of
apartheid. Though always contested by those opposed to the two liberation move-
ments’ communist links and/or their violent strategies, that hold helps to explain the
cautious, ambiguous, and in some cases hostile response of many foreign critics of
apartheid to the emergence of new movements opposed to apartheid inside South
Africa in the s and s, including the black consciousness movement and the
independent trade union movement.22 After the suppression of the ANC inside South
Africa in the early s the simple physical survival of the organization was by no
means inevitable. The external support the ANC received from liberals, socialists, and
communists around the world helped sustain it in exile and thus assisted its eventual
reemergence inside South Africa in the s and its subsequent ascendancy over the
internally based resistance movement and accession to power in .23
In the early sixties, the transnational linkages and networks of support that Skinner
shows had developed in the s outside Africa for the ANC specifically also helped
ensure the organization was able to establish itself internationally and remain a
significant player in external action against apartheid at a time when many newly
independent states within Africa strongly favored the PAC. (Although most anti-
apartheid bodies outside Africa officially followed the practice of the Organisation of
African Unity and recognized both the ANC and the PAC, in practice many—
including the AAM in Britain and ACOA in the United States—favored the ANC, in
part because of the relationships established between ANC leaders and international
supporters before the PAC’s formation in .) Skinner’s research thus qualifies
Irwin’s argument that “the ideology of [racially exclusive] African nationalism
animated the anti-apartheid movement in the early s.” For Irwin, the ANC was
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“isolated ideologically” by its commitment to multiracialism and consequently “toiled
at the periphery of the apartheid debate” in the first half of the postcolonial decade.
The PAC’s brand of more racially exclusive African nationalism, in contrast, made it
much more ideologically compatible with African nationalists elsewhere on the
continent. Despite the PAC’s subsequent troubled exile history and decline, Irwin
argues that initially this ideological affinity meant that “the PAC’s path abroad was
much easier after the Sharpeville Massacre” than the ANC’s, as the PAC quickly found
favor with the African states that also led the anti-apartheid campaign at the UN
(–, ).24
Although Irwin is too quick to dismiss the support the ANC enjoyed beyond
Africa in the early sixties, his emphasis on the international prominence of the PAC
in this period is a necessary corrective to the teleological temptation to assume that
the ANC’s leading role in the struggle against apartheid to have been constant over
time, and the consequent tendency to devote less scholarly attention to other
non–ANC-aligned South African anti-apartheid bodies, including the PAC.25 The
PAC’s international successes were, however, short lived. The overthrow of Kwame
Nkrumah in Ghana in  deprived it of its leading external backer, and it ended
the decade ideologically adrift, deprived of resources, and wracked by splits and
internal dissension. For Irwin, these declining fortunes of the PAC were symptomatic
of a major shift in the terms in which opposition to apartheid was expressed after the
defeat of the campaign for UN sanctions in the mid-s and the discrediting of the
African nationalist diplomats who had spearheaded it. After that watershed, “liber-
ation organizations throughout southern Africa were building relationships with
groups beyond Africa, supplanting the ideological bonds of postcolonial nationalism
with broader discourses that emphasized human rights, Third Worldism, and Marxist
internationalism.” Successfully pursuing this approach, the ANC was able by the end
of the decade to “reposition itself at the vanguard” of what Irwin characterizes as “the
postnationalist anti-apartheid movement” (, –).
Even if Irwin’s portrayal of this transition is overly stark, he nevertheless reveals
an important shift in the struggle against apartheid in the course of the decade from
the dominance of anticolonial discourses (whether or not animated by racially defined
African nationalism) to that of anti-imperialist ones that privileged emphasis on apart-
heid’s relationship to capitalism and thus portrayed the “apartheid crisis [as] bigger
than Africa.” By the late s the struggle against apartheid was increasingly under-
stood by the liberation movements and many of their Western supporters as part of
“a shared Third World Struggle” against American imperialism, characterized in one
ANC discussion paper Irwin quotes as the “main enemy” of the South African people
(, , ).26
The relationship of human rights ideas to this shift is perhaps more complex than
Irwin suggests, however. Irwin convincingly demonstrates that, following the impasse
on sanctions at the UN, E. S. Reddy, head of the UN Special Unit on Apartheid and
the leading UN official concerned with the issue, adopted a classic venue-shopping
approach in which his unit sought to bring more nonstate organizations into the
struggle against apartheid by encouraging them “to engage in great activity at their
own level and according to their own policies,” whether such efforts were “purely
humanitarian” or “pacifist or limited to specific aspects, etc.” From the mid-s,
humanitarian and human rights questions thus came to be foregrounded in the UN
bureaucracy’s proliferating propaganda initiatives against apartheid ().27 Whether
the ANC itself really “seamlessly married multiracial solidarity and human rights with
labor unity and Leninist anti-imperialism,” as Irwin suggests, is less clear. ANC propa-
gandists undoubtedly recognized the power of humanitarian appeals to mobilize moral
and material support in the West, but the ANC’s self-conception as a revolutionary
moment rather than a “civil rights movement content with superficial changes and
cosmetic reform” tended to lead the organization to avoid framing opposition to
apartheid in humanitarian or human rights terms (, ). Overall, Irwin’s evidence
does little to undermine the thesis recently advanced by Saul Dubow that the ANC’s
“embrace of human rights” did not occur until the mid- to late s—and even then
was a gradual and contested process.28
The differences in Skinner and Irwin’s analyses of the ideologies animating the anti-
apartheid struggle are attributable in large part to the different actors on which they
focus. A third major issue that arises from their accounts is thus the question of what
the anti-apartheid movement was. Addressing this issue, E. S. Reddy, the UN official
who was a central nodal figure in the global anti-apartheid movement, has
commented:
I think of the “anti-apartheid movement” as a coalition of anti-apartheid organis-
ations and individuals, as well as a growing number of governments, which in the
s was able to secure the active involvement of the United Nations, the
Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) and many other international organisations. This was a coalition which
encompassed the world and consisted of international, regional, national and local
bodies.29
In practice, most scholars have adopted a much less capacious approach. Because
previous studies of anti-apartheid campaigning in the West have tended to focus on
anti-apartheid activity within a single country, they have usually analyzed the anti-
apartheid movement as a nonstate phenomenon. Even as Skinner seeks to expand his
analytical frame to encompass the anti-apartheid movement beyond a single state, he
sticks closely to this approach. His emphasis on the anti-apartheid movement as
consisting of “transnational networks” appears by definition to exclude the possibility
that states could be part of that movement.30
Irwin has been justly praised for adopting a more encompassing approach to
defining the anti-apartheid movement. As another reviewer puts it, “The interests of
activists, archivists, and writers have resulted in a skewed focus on the antiapartheid
activities of American and British activists . . . Gordian Knot thus provides an
important analysis of the crucial role of African states and actors.”31 In an explicit
riposte to previous scholars of this topic, Irwin argues trenchantly that in the first half
of the s the anti-apartheid movement was “defined not by Western liberals,
church leaders, or civil rights groups in the United States but by African nationalists
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from the Third World” (). For Irwin, the watershed ICJ decision in  subse-
quently had the effect of “redefining” the anti-apartheid movement, as “political
momentum within southern Africa . . . shifted definitively to leaders in the nongov-
ernmental realm,” creating “a less discrete and more pervasive anti-apartheid
movement” (, , ).
In his account of the first half of the sixties, Irwin’s positioning of the newly
independent African states at the center of his analysis provides a necessary corrective.
But his portrayal of a shift from a state-based to a nonstate anti-apartheid movement
is again overly stark: while undoubtedly the global anti-apartheid alliance was never
again as singly fixated on state action against apartheid as it was in the early s,
African states continued to play a variety of significant roles in external anti-apartheid
campaigning, from the African boycott of the  Montreal Olympics to the
confrontations between African states and the British government of Margaret
Thatcher at Commonwealth summits in the s. Even in the early s, moreover,
as Skinner shows, nongovernmental actors played an influential role in shaping the
framework within which the struggle against apartheid occurred. Indeed, the period
of years during which African decolonization occurred—and on which Irwin
focuses—offered opportunities for nonstate actors to exert an unusual degree of
influence. Many of those anticolonial nationalist movements that had already taken
control of new states continued to cooperate closely both with nationalist groups that
had not yet achieved that objective in their own territories and with other nongovern-
mental organizations that had assisted them in their own earlier struggle for statehood.
These alliances with nonstate actors took on particular significance at a time when
many new states lacked extensive foreign affairs apparatuses of their own.
To take just one example, the International Conference on Economic Sanctions
against South Africa in London in April , with which Skinner closes his account,
exerted a significant influence on the debates at the United Nations on which Irwin
focuses. The papers from the conference were widely circulated among UN delega-
tions and were quoted extensively in Security Council debates and in the April 
report of the “Group of Experts” that had been appointed by the Security Council
“to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa.”32 The
conference was a striking example of the fluidity of relations between state and
nonstate actors in this period. It was organized under the auspices of the nongovern-
mental British AAM, funded by several African states, and attended by a mix of South
African exiles, “official” delegations of state representatives from independent African
and Asian states and some Communist states, and “unofficial” delegations of nongov-
ernmental organizations from Western states, all of whom interacted on a basis of
formal equality (Skinner, –).33
Just as they focus on different anti-apartheid actors, Skinner and Irwin likewise differ
in the targets of anti-apartheid activity whose responses they study. That both authors
include such targets in the analyses at all is relatively unusual. The impact of the
actions of the global anti-apartheid movement either within South Africa or on the
intermediate bodies through which it sought to exert influence—Western govern-
ments, multinational corporations, sports organizations, and so on—has so far been
the subject of surprisingly little scholarly research.34 Most studies of the global anti-
apartheid movement have kept their focus firmly on the activist opponents of
apartheid and have little concrete to say about the impact of anti-apartheid activities,
which is often assumed or implied rather analyzed.
In contrast, Skinner and Irwin devote considerable attention to the impact of anti-
apartheid campaigns on, respectively, British and American government policy in the
s. For most of The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid the UK government is not a
significant actor, but in his final chapter, on the period from  to , Skinner
incorporates a detailed analysis of British government policy toward South Africa, and
in particular of the government’s attitude toward the anti-apartheid movement’s
emerging sanctions campaign. That policy has received remarkably little scholarly
attention in the past, and Skinner’s account is among the first archivally based studies
of this specific issue.35 Similarly, although there is a much richer literature on U.S.
foreign relations with South Africa, there has traditionally been a clear historio-
graphical separation of studies of the anti-apartheid movement on the one hand, and
of U.S. governmental policy on the other.36 Irwin’s work represents one of the first
attempts to focus explicitly on the question of how that policy was influenced by the
international campaign against apartheid.
As Irwin suggests, in the s both the South African government and its oppo-
nents “accepted that the great powers, with their military strength, economic
influence, and Security Council authority, were the arbiters of South Africa’s fate,
with the power either to punish the Union for its policies or insulate it from interna-
tional criticism” (). Skinner and Irwin’s differing choices on which of the “great
powers” to focus on reflect their strikingly different analyses of who in the interna-
tional system wielded greatest power over South Africa in this period. For Irwin, the
early s “marked the highpoint of America’s geopolitical predominance in the
world”: the United States was an “unquestioned hegemon” (). In contrast, Skinner’s
focus on the “imperial networks” that had long linked Britain and South Africa—and
on the British government’s ongoing determination not to allow those networks to be
disrupted—leads him to attribute primary external influence over South Africa to
Britain. For Skinner therefore, “The determination of the British government to
preserve relations with South Africa . . . appeared to show that there was little that
the international community could do that would have an influence over the direction
of apartheid policy” during the s ().
These two accounts, counterposing post- American Cold War dominance
with the ongoing legacies of British imperial authority in parts of the world formerly
under British control are complementary, more convincing when read in conjunction
than either is alone. Skinner shows that the anti-apartheid movement’s campaign for
sanctions had minimal effect on UK government policy (though British officials “paid
close attention” to the  International Conference on Economic Sanctions and
prepared detailed refutations of the papers presented). Cognizant of the United
Kingdom’s significant economic interests in South Africa, British policymakers were
prepared to veto any Security Council resolution on sanctions. But it is clear from
Skinner’s account that British officials were nevertheless deeply concerned that the
U.S. government might waver in its opposition to sanctions, and that they devoted
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considerable energy to trying to prevent this. Irwin’s research suggests that they were
right to be worried. Sensitive to pressure from the African states demanding Western
action against apartheid, the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, led by
Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams, came to “embrace” sanc-
tions, Irwin argues. Although the Bureau was always opposed by the Pentagon, the
CIA, and other elements within the Department of State—all of which continued to
place more emphasis on avoiding any risk to U.S. Cold War strategic interests in
South Africa—the Bureau’s arguments gained increasing traction in the early years of
Lyndon Johnson’s administration. Before the  ruling by the ICJ, State
Department officials anticipated that the Court would rule against South Africa,
and—under pressure from the African states demanding Western action against
apartheid—“many felt that sanctions against Pretoria would eventually become
unavoidable” if the United States wanted to avoid destroying the legitimacy of the
Americentric liberal world order built on institutions such as the Court and the
United Nations (Irwin, , ).
Irwin may be exaggerating when he suggests that, on the eve of the ICJ’s judgment
in the South West Africa case in mid-, “Having just passed legislation that ended
Jim Crow in the American South, [Johnson] appeared poised to implement symmet-
rical action against apartheid” through Security Council enforcement of the
anticipated ruling against South Africa. Certainly, as British officials quoted by Irwin
observed, it seemed “almost inconceivable that the Americans would be prepared to
cast their first [Security Council] veto in favour of the White man in southern Africa,
let alone veto an attempt to uphold the rule of law which had been flouted by the
White minority.” But Johnson’s comment in a meeting immediately before the ruling
that “even a blind hog may find an acorn” highlighted that American policy continued
to rest on the hope that the United States could avoid ever being presented with such
a stark choice. (U.S. policymakers’ first hope was that through quiet diplomatic
pressure they would be able to convince the South African government to comply
sufficiently with an ICJ ruling concerning the status and administration of South West
Africa as to render irrelevant the question of enforcement measures.) Moreover,
Irwin’s claim that “Western inaction” if enforcement of an ICJ ruling against South
Africa became necessary “was almost unthinkable” ignores the British government’s
ongoing willingness to veto a Security Council sanctions resolution, as emphasized by
Skinner (Irwin, , ).
Even if the likelihood of Western-backed mandatory UN economic sanctions was not
as great as Irwin implies, he convincingly demonstrates how desperately concerned the
South African government was throughout the first half of the s that the African
states’ campaign for sanctions at the UN and ICJ might ultimately threaten the
survival of the apartheid regime. Indeed, Gordian Knot represents one of the first
archivally based attempts to analyze how the South African government perceived and
responded to external campaigns against apartheid.37 As South Africa became increas-
ingly isolated within the UN, Irwin shows, the South African government responded
to the African states’ sanctions campaign not only directly, at the UN itself, but also
by launching a propaganda “counteroffensive” in the West intended to influence both
political decision makers and influential nongovernmental actors such as foreign
investors (, ).38
That one element stressed in South Africa’s propaganda campaign was “multina-
tionalism” (in , in an effort to align apartheid with the new prevailing norm of
self-determination, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announced plans for the “inde-
pendence” of the Transkei bantustan) highlights that apartheid itself was a moving
target over its four-decade duration. Irwin’s relatively brief analysis of this
phenomenon, and Skinner’s decision not to investigate how the South African
government perceived and responded to the emergence in the s of the transna-
tional anti-apartheid networks that are the focus of his study, in part reflect the
different frames of analysis through which the international struggle against apartheid
can be viewed. Scholars have assessed the significance and impact of external action
against apartheid on at least three interlinked but distinguishable levels. First and most
obviously, there is the significance of such action to South Africa itself: the impact of
that action on South Africa’s political, economic, and social order, on the nature of
the apartheid regime, and ultimately on the country’s transition from apartheid and
minority rule to nonracial democracy. Skinner and Irwin both make nods in this
direction: The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid opens with a meditation on the end of
apartheid, while the conclusion of Gordian Knot begins with a description of Nelson
Mandela’s release from prison in . But although it is at this level that the signifi-
cance of the global anti-apartheid movement is most commonly understood, both
popularly and in the academy, scholarly research on the role of international factors
in the end of apartheid is in its infancy.39
Indeed, elsewhere Skinner has argued forthrightly that the significance of the
British AAM “is not located in the birth of a democratic South Africa” and has criti-
cized other scholarship whose assessment of the AAM’s impact is overly “determined
by the priorities of the movement itself.”40 Skinner’s work on external anti-apartheid
activism tends to focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the second level at which
that impact has been studied: the significance of external movements against apartheid
for understanding the politics, society, and culture of the states within which they
operated.41 In his work on the British AAM, Skinner has argued that the Movement’s
significance is located “in the various ways it embodied the shifting nature of political
activism in Britain and the relationship between domestic and global political culture”:
“Anti-apartheid represents an emerging phenomenon of contemporary political
activity: a movement operating simultaneously in both a national and global political
space . . . [It] provides a key example of the ways in which post-war political partici-
pation has stretched the definition of organised political activity—in terms of both
form, and the arena in which it operates.” Even as Skinner widens his lens beyond
Britain in The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid to incorporate anti-apartheid networks
in the United States, it is this perspective that continues to underlie his work: “anti-
apartheid was an integral part of a shift in British civil society,” he argues in the final
chapter.42
Skinner’s argument that one element of that shift was the integration of national
civil society with an emerging “global civil society” points to the third level at which
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external action against apartheid has been understood: its significance for under-
standing international or global politics.43 This is Irwin’s primary concern. For Irwin,
though the “apartheid debate” was not the most important issue of the s, its
history is a means to analyze the “unmaking” after the watershed in the middle of the
postcolonial decade of the “liberal world order,” as actors on all sides of the apartheid
debate disengaged from the international institutions on which that order had been
established by the United States after the Second World War, and in which newly
independent states had initially invested their hopes.
The relative importance to be assigned to these three levels for assessing the
significance of the anti-apartheid movement depends entirely on perspective. As
heuristic devices, the levels are, moreover, interlinked in complex and fascinating ways,
as the work of both Skinner and Irwin suggests. Gordian Knot and The Foundations of
Anti-Apartheid represent significant and complementary advances in our under-
standing of the external struggle against apartheid. In their differing approaches to
periodization, strategy, and ideology, and in the different actors on which they focus,
they make major contributions with which all future analyses of this topic—at
whichever level they focus—will engage.
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